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Abstract

“digital” measures do not say much about the impact
of digitalization on traditional “analog” governance,
thus lending support to a dangerous idea that
countries can compensate lack progress in their
governance systems by simply digitalizing them.
This situation is confusing for policy makers who
introduce relevant policies; for public managers who
implement such policies; for citizens who need a
clear picture of how digitalization will change their
interactions with authorities; and for businesses that
need assurances of good governance and the rule of
law. Such expectations may be compromised by
nefarious state actors claiming that because their
country is digitally successful, it is also well
governed. Such claims can be supported by arbitrary
selections of benchmarks to create an ambiguous and
partitioned picture of the reality.
This paper provides a path to addressing both
problems. First, the identified problems are expressed
through qualitative statements and mapped into
numbers and correlations. Second, a single synthetic
indicator is built to measure digital government by
integrating relevant NRI indicators. This step applies
factor analysis to identify two uncorrelated
dimensions of digital government and construct one
synthetic indicator using those dimensions. Third, we
integrate this new measure with WGI variables that
represent analog governance. Using multidimensional
linear ordering, this step creates a combined indicator
that expresses progress on both (digital and analog)
sides of governance. It should be stated that these
new measures are not new benchmarks in terms of
frameworks, data collection, etc., but the result of
calculation carried out upon existing indicators.
Concerning terminology, we treat “analog”
governance as synonymous with public governance.
The term does not have a settled definition [1], e.g.
[2] associates governance with “structures and
decision-making processes that allow a state … to
conduct affairs”, and [3] defines it as “the exercise of
… authority … to manage a nations affairs”. Here,
we are interested in those aspects of governance that
can be associated with state policy and public value
development [4]. Although we chose not to subscribe

Reliable benchmarking is essential for effective
management of the government digitalization efforts.
Existing benchmarking instruments generally fail to
support this target. One problem is the diversity of
instruments, resulting in a split image of digital
progress and adding ambiguity to policy decisions.
Another problem is disconnect in assessing progress
between
digital
and
traditional
“analog”
governance, lending support to a dangerous idea that
countries can compensate for lack of progress in
their governance systems by simply digitalizing them.
This paper provides a path to addressing both
problems by: aggregating relevant indicators of the
World Economic Forum’s Network Readiness Index
(NRI) to obtain a single synthetic measure of digital
government, balancing this measure with progress in
analog governance using World Bank’s Worldwide
Governance Indicators (WGI), calculating new
measures for the latest editions of NRI and WGI, and
discussing results. Technically, the paper applies
multidimensional linear ordering and factor analysis.

1. Introduction
When treating digital government as a deliberate,
perceptible, designable and measurable arrangement
of tools, decisions and actions, there is a rudimentary
need for data-based benchmarking that is able to
capture and compare digital government performance
among countries, states, cities and other entities.
Established instruments such as the NRI or the
United Nations’ e-Government Development Index
serve different goals, implement different models and
target different users. However, those who rely on
such instruments to perform consequential decisions,
i.e. policymakers and public managers responsible
for overseeing the construction of digital government,
encounter at least two issues here: 1) the diversity of
benchmarks makes the image of digital government
progress split and ambiguous, and thus difficult to
translate to concrete policy decisions; and 2) the
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to any particular conceptualization, we treat WGI as a
conceptual and quantitative basis for representing
“analog” governance. On the digital side, we adopted
the conceptualization provided by NRI, and discuss
the meaning of digital government in Section 2.2.
This work studies conceptual and practical issues
that hinder digital government assessment, if treated
as a subject connected to traditional governance, in
contrast to existing measurements that consider this
subject in isolation, disconnected from its “analog”
foundations. Hence this work targets the needs of: 1)
policy-makers searching for balanced paths to
government digitalization that improves public
governance; 2) practitioners seeking reliable and
versatile methods of measuring digital government;
and 3) researchers looking for a quantitative grasp of
digital government studied in a conceptual manner.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 examines digital government benchmarking
and identifies related problems and conceptual issues.
Section 3 presents the research problem, and methods
and tools used to address it. Section 4 describes the
results achieved, followed by discussion in Section 5.
Section 6 provides the summary and limitations of
this work and outlines directions for future work.

2. Background and Problem Formulation
The aim of this section is to present theoretical
concepts and practical problems associated with
digital government benchmarking. The outcome
relies on the literature review, performed on Scopus
using the search term ("digital government” OR "egovernment" OR “e-governance”) AND ("theory"
OR “model” OR “framework”) AND ("evaluation"
OR “benchmark” OR “measurement”), and using the
snowballing technique. We examined the papers to
confirm their relevance. Theoretical and practical
aspects of digital government benchmarking are
outlined in Section 2.1, and two problems addressed
– diversity and digital-analog disconnect of existing
digital government benchmark instruments – are
covered in Sections 2.2 and 2.3 respectively.

2.1. Digital government benchmarking
Benchmarking is a relatively new form of
activity, [5], dating back to late 1980s, although its
historical roots can be found much earlier [6]. With
digital government arriving in early 1990s, and the
first digital government benchmarking instruments
appearing in early 2000s, lack of universal consensus
of what and how should be measured to establish the
maturity of digital government is unsurprising.

Various efforts have been underway to equip
digital government evaluation with solid theoretical
foundations, e.g. in terms of the “readiness” construct
[7][8], using “socio-technical models” to underpin
key design elements of information systems [9],
structuring the benchmarking activity using Activity
Theory [10], employing advanced multi-criteria
decision support models [11], and introducing
context-driven benchmarking for digital government
services [12]. The reasons, scope and methods of
digital government benchmarking were also provided
as recommendations for practitioners [13].
The wealth of approaches to digital government
benchmarking give rise to measurement instruments
that vary in their goals, examined units, technical
construction, etc. For instance, [14] lists seven
instruments that capture country-level data, from
global studies like the United Nations’ e-Government
Survey or the World Economic Forum’s (WEF’s)
NRI, to local studies such as McKinsey’s study on
Middle East digital economy; [15] presents a
collection of benchmarks divided into academic and
commercial instruments; and [16] introduces indices
that confirm diversification of available instruments.
According to [17], various approaches towards the
methods and goals of measurement are reflected by
digital strategies of individual countries.
The literature also includes critique of existing
benchmarks, taking different positions, covering
various aspects, proposing different improvements.
For example, [7] questions the data-gathering
approach and limited informational value of the UN
benchmark, [13] points out limitations of benchmarks
focusing on adoption and use rather than outcomes
and impact, and [18] uncovers various technical
limitation of benchmarks including their failure to
“differentiate between static websites and highly
integrated and interactive portals”.
Our study does not focus on the construction of
yet another benchmarking instrument, but on the
question of how to effectively use the information
provided by existing instruments and how to merge
such information with external information to create
a new value. This standpoint can be associated with
various statements from the literature. For instance,
the statement that “any ranking system needs a final
single scale” [15] is refuted by the diversity of
instruments, [19] notices “forgetting citizens’ needs,
demands or expectations” in the domain of digital
government, while [20] observes the failure of
instruments “to capture the expected transformative
effects of ICT on government”. Hence the central
premise underlying our study is using existing
indicators to uncover a consistent message about the
actual effects that digitalization has on governance.
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2.2. Problem 1: Diversity of benchmarks
The benchmarks vary substantially, e.g. in terms
of their logic. From a practical viewpoint, while some
specialization is needed when accompanied by
interpretative care [15], the diversity and mutual
incoherence of benchmarks is confusing, especially
to policy makers that expect a clear assessment of
their digital policies. The following literature-based
observations explain the causes of such diversity.
The first cause is the capacity and negotiability of
the concept itself. Defining digital government as
government use of digital technology trivializes the
problem, claiming that harnessing a new facility
creates a new entity as a matter of course, while
focusing on two umbrella terms – government and
digital – leaves room for interpretation. Definitions
vary in scope – from information to democracy,
technology – from computers to Internet, and subject
– from citizens to stakeholders [21]. Over time,
expectations grow towards transformation rather than
information or service supply [22]. Technological
and transformative structure and operation are at the
core of the concept [23]. Besides such variety, digital
government is also considered to undergo evolution
[24]. In summary, the richness of the concept implies
heterogeneity of its measurement approaches.
The second is the assumption of benchmark’s
coherence with its own objectives and framework
rather than the digital government landscape. This is
not necessarily negative – [15] associates it with
targeting “to answer specific and narrow questions”,
but comes with “tunnel effects” and “risk avoidance”
due to deep specialization [25]. Similarly, limited
representation of certain categories draws upon
“restricted definition of eGovernment” [26].
Nonetheless, established international benchmarks
manifest their goals rather clearly, e.g. with NRI
grouping numerous indicators into categories.
Attempts at unifying benchmarks via synthetic
models [27] or composite indices [28] are also noted.

2.3. Problem 2: Digital-analog disconnect
While varying in focus, logic, etc. the benchmarks
measure digital government in isolation, not part of
the traditional “analog” government. However, this
context is compelling, if not central, for evaluating
digital efforts. Pure digital benchmarking can be still
useful, but one should maintain some reserve when
drawing conclusions on it. Some countries treat high
positions in digital rankings as a target in itself [5],
which can be stimulating for digital architects but
confusing for those who seek reliable assessment of
digitally-enabled governance in such countries.

The influence of digitalization on governance is
expressed in declarations, normative statements and
even mounted in digital government definitions. UN
underlines its strategic role in human development
[29]. OECD points at efficiency improvements,
enhanced service quality and policy outcomes [30].
ITU suggests economic benefits – cost reduction,
improved management and better procurement [31].
Benefits covering social issues, democracy, natural
resources, education, etc. are also put forward [21].
Research literature brings various proofs of the
transformative potential of digital government for
better governance [32], transparency and structural
change [33], civic involvement in democratic reform
[34], and reshaping democratic governance [35].
Expectations are substantiated towards, e.g. citizen
empowerment [36], support to democracy [37] and
transformation and accountability [33]. In summary,
expectations towards “analog” yields of digital
government are strongly justified, thus assessing the
“analog” impact of digital government is relevant.
Various data-based studies were carried out to
examine the presence and strength of the digitalanalog link. For instance, [38] studied digital-analog
correlations via relevant measures on both sides,
confirming conformity in the area of government
effectiveness and uncovering discrepancy in the area
of democracy. A link between digital government
and good governance [39] was also examined, with
digital technology causing 57% progress in good
governance indicators [40]. The connection between
WGI [41] and e-government benefits was
conceptualized in [42], and confirmed strongly for
the Balkan states [43] and weakly for Indonesia [44].
The analog-digital connection was also explored
in the digital democracy domain. Confronting the
UN’s e-participation index with measures of actual
democracy and Internet freedom, [45] concluded the
failure of the index to deliver consistent results,
offering elaboration of the e-participation framework
[46]. A new e-Democracy index was offered to ease
such dissonance [47]. According to [48], political
regime and government capacity influence digital
government. Also, positive impact on government
effectiveness and civil liberties, but lack of such
impact on the level of corruption were proven in [49].
The review above confirms interest in assessing
digital government outcomes. Considering measures
of outcome, most initiatives pay limited attention to
the effects of digital transformation. For instance,
NRI [50] measures user satisfaction, but cares little
about the impact on policy and governance. In our
view, only a comparison of benchmark’s results with
indicators external to it can bring a reliable
assessment of digital government efforts.
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3. Methodology
This section presents the approach adopted in this
paper to address the two identified problems,
problem 1 in Section 3.1 and problem 2 in Section
3.2. In each section, the problem is quantified, and a
matching statistical technique is provided.

3.1. Problem 1: Diversity of benchmarks
Diversity of benchmarks could be regarded as a
problem of data overflow, if different benchmarks
raise the level of knowledge about digital government
or merely create cognitive confusion. And even if the
informational value is revealed, is this value unique
or another expression of a more general message?

To illustrate this issue, we explored the NRI data,
a comprehensive instrument that takes a broad view
over digitalization issues, including governance [51].
The official dataset [52] contains data collected for
151 entities, mainly independent states, covering
several years. In the analysis, we used the data for the
most recent year, 2016. Among calculated indices we
identified five that refer to digital government, three
belonging to the “Government usage” pillar: 8.01)
Importance of ICT to government vision, 8.02)
Government Online Service Index, and 8.03)
Government success in ICT promotion, and two to
the “Social impacts”: 10.03) ICT use and government
efficiency and 10.04) E-Participation Index [50].
Table 1 describes this set in more detail, along with
the respective operational labels used in our research.

Table 1. NRI digital government indicators, source: [52]
NRI indicator

Description

Label

8.01 Importance of ICTs
to government vision

To what extent does the government have a clear implementation plan for utilizing ICTs
to improve your country’s overall competitiveness? [1 = not at all—there is no plan; 7 =
to a great extent—there is a clear plan]
The Government Online Service Index assesses the quality of government’s delivery of
online services on a 0-to-1 (best) scale.
In your country, how successful is the government in promoting the use of ICTs? [1 =
not successful at all; 7 = extremely successful]
In your country, to what extent does the use of ICTs by the government improve the
quality of government services to the population? [1 = not at all; 7 = to a great extent]
The E-Participation Index assesses, on a 0-to-1 (best) scale, the quality, relevance, and
usefulness of government websites in providing online information and participatory
tools and services to their citizens.

D_VISION

8.02 Government Online
Service Index
8.03 Government success
in ICT promotion
10.03 ICT use and
government efficiency
10.04 E-Participation
Index

The indices 8.01, 8.03 and 10.03 are based on the
WEF’s own surveys while 8.02 and 10.04 are based
on the UN’s E-Government Survey. The former are
in the range 1-7 and the latter in the range 0-1. To
ensure the same scale, we rescaled the UN indicators
to the 1-7 range. After elimination of rows with
missing data, 137 individual observations remained.
The correlation matrix, i.e. correlation coefficient
value in the scale from negative 1 to positive 1, for
the five examined variables is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1. NRI variables – correlation matrix

D_SERVICE
D_PROMOTION
D_EFFICIENCY
D_PARTICIPATION

All pairs are positively correlated, with four pairs
revealing very strong correlation (above 0.9). This
confirms the assumption of data redundancy –
significant parts of the original information is shared
across variables, and could be expressed with little
information loss using fewer variables. The desirable
outcome would be replacing fragmentary measures
with a one that synthesizes the original information.
In search of the synthetic indicator, we decided to
apply the dimensionality reduction technique, i.e.
replacing a set of variables with a smaller set while
saving most of the original information [53][54][55].
One of common approaches to dimensionality
reduction are principal component (PCA) and factor
analysis (FA) [56][57]. To ensure mathematical
correctness of this approach, we confirmed that the
PCA/FA assumptions are satisfied for our dataset.
To build the synthetic indicator, we followed the
four steps described in [56][57][58]. The first checks
the correlation of data as only correlated variables
can benefit from this approach. As observed before,
the NRI indicators are mostly strongly correlated.
The second determines how many components
(factors) extracted with PCA analysis are sufficient.
We followed formal criteria, e.g. the Kaiser criterion
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to retain the factors with eigenvalue bigger or equal
to 1 [56][57][58]. The third step involves rotating the
coordinate system axes to reflect original variables on
the retaining factors in terms of “loadings”. Among
various algorithms, we chose varimax rotation [59].
The fourth step constructs the synthetic indicator on
the basis of the outcomes of FA, after rotation.
Given that the total information, i.e. variation,
from the original dataset is distributed among
calculated components ordered by their variation
share [56], this method is likely to determine a small
number of components to represent the examined
concept, i.e. digital government according to NRI.
Hence, despite reducing the number of variables, the
amount of information is left almost intact.
We found the approach effective, transparent –
there are no arbitrary variable weighting assumptions
or “hidden” algorithms, and relevant – it addresses
the problem. However, the method has also its
limitations [56]. Primarily, since the calculation is
based on historical data, conclusions are applicable to
a posteriori analysis, but there is no guarantee that the
validity of such calculations will be preserved in the
future. While statistical inference may address this
limitations to some extent, this is beyond this study.

we selected the matching 137 observations. Table 2
describes this set, along with the labels used.
The digital-analog disconnect problem can be also
illustrated by means of correlation. The correlation
matrix between variables belonging to the digital and
analog datasets is depicted in Figure 2. The figure
reveals that while some pairs are strongly correlated,
the correlation is moderate to weak for most pairs.
For example, the analog voice is poorly reflected by
any digital indicator. The message is clear: there is no
justification for extrapolating digital government
progress with progress in “analog” governance. Thus
pure digital measures should be treated with caution
or, as below, should be augmented with analog
components to yield a more balanced measure.
To this end, we decided to harness a multivariate
technique called linear ordering [62]. The technique
classifies research objects, e.g. countries, in regard to
some synthetic latent measure that balances the
relevant aspects expressed by directly measured input
indicators [62][63]. The result is a one-dimensional
ranking of development within a certain domain, in
our case balanced digital-analog governance.

3.2. Problem 2: Digital-analog disconnect
To address lack of substantial digital-analog
connection, we need a set of indicators to represent
the performance of “analog” governance. To this end,
we decided to use the World Bank’s WGI, released
on the basis of the arguably most comprehensive and
enduring governance framework. The instrument
measures six dimensions expressed in composite
indicators [60]. The official dataset [61] contains data
collected for over 200 countries captured on a yearly
basis from 1996 to 2017, measured on a standardized
scale with the mean 0 and standard deviation 1. To
make this data comparable with the “digital” dataset,

Figure 2. NRI vs WGI correlations

Table 2. Worldwide Governance Indicators, source: [61]
WGI indicator

Description

Label

Control
of Corruption
Government
Effectiveness

Captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain,
including corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests.
Captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the
degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and
implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies.
Measures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically-motivated
violence, including terrorism.
Captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound
policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development.
Captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules
of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police,
and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.
Captures perceptions of the extent to which a citizens are able to participate in selecting their
government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.

A_CONTROL

Political Stability and
Absence of Violence
Regulatory Quality
Rule of Law

Voice
and Accountability

A_EFFECTIVENESS

A_STABILITY
A_REGULATION
A_LAW

A_VOICE
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A common approach is to determine for each of
the input variables whether it contributes to the
phenomenon in a positive, negative or neutral way –
in our case such contributions should be positive, and
optionally how significant is the contribution [62].
Among existing ordering algorithms [62] we decided
to use the Ideal Type, which identifies two theoretical
objects, the best “ideal type” with maximum levels of
indicators and “anti-ideal type” with minimum levels.
For each examined object, a synthetic measure is then
calculated comparing this object’s performance to the
distance between the ideal and anti-ideal types.
The key message is that this method allows for
creating one combined digital-analog indicator,
where performance on the digital side is balanced by
performance on the analog side. This construction is
in line with our key assumption that digital
government is not in competition with, neither an
alternative to “traditional” governance.
The above calculations were performed with MS
Excel and R, including “psych” library for PCA/FA
and one of the authors’ own linear ordering program.

Table 4, two varimax-rotated factors with normalized
variable loadings, shows a legible arrangement of the
factors. The main observation is that vision,
promotion and efficiency – the NRI’s variables
measuring citizen perception – are mapped mostly to
factor 1, with respective loadings of 0.95, 0.96 and
0.90, while service and participation – the variables
“borrowed” from the UN E-Government Survey – are
mostly mapped to factor 2, with respective loadings
of 0.93 and 0.96. Hence the first factor could be
identified with “citizen perception”, while the other
with “measured effectiveness” of digital government.
Considering factor scorings for countries, obtained by
summing raw scores [64] and scaling them to 1-7,
the best factor 1 scores were: United Arab Emirates
(6.15), Singapore (6.09), Qatar (5.72), and Rwanda
(5.53), while the best factor 2 scores were: Singapore
(6.45), Republic of Korea (6.36), United Arab
Emirates (6.16) and the Netherlands (6.16).
Table 4. Variables and factors after rotation
Loadings on
factor 1 factor 2
D_VISION
0.95
0.26
D_SERVICE
0.33
0.93
D_PROMOTION
0.96
0.25
D_EFFICIENCY
0.90
0.39
D_PARTICIPATION
0.23
0.96
Sum of squared loadings:
2.79
2.07
Share in whole variance:
56%
41%
Share in explained variance: 57%
43%
Variable

4. Findings
This section presents the results achieved by
means of the approach introduced in Section 3.
First, we checked the digital variables against the
PCA/FA assumptions. There was one outlier, United
Arab Emirates with D_PROMOTION at 6.21. To
prevent it from distorting the analysis, this case was
excluded from factor calculations. Given 5 input
variables, the remaining 136 records were deemed
sufficient. Measure of the sampling adequacy, based
on the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test – 0.73 and empirical
p-value in Bartlett’s test – 3.5e-224 confirmed that
the dataset was adequate. Hence, we applied the
synthetic indicator construction algorithm.
To determine the number of factors, the initial set
of non-rotated PCA-extracted components was
calculated. Table 3 shows the components ordered by
their eigenvalues, i.e. the share of original variance.
As components 1 and 2 together cover 97% of the
original information, we decided that the optimal
target number of factors for further analysis was two.
Table 3. NRI dataset - PCA-extracted components

Eigenvalue
Cumulative
share of variance

Component number
1
2
3
3.84
1.02 0.08
77%
97% 99%

4
0.04
99%

5
0.03
100%

Common
variance
97%
98%
98%
96%
98%
n/a
n/a
n/a

The groupings identified two “composite” indicators,
the first containing vision (weight 0.95), promotion
(0.96) and efficiency (0.90), and the second service
(0.93) and participation (0.96). In line with the
previous procedure, further calculations resulted in
the final synthetic indicator’s (D_GOV’s) weights for
all five variables: vision – 0.20, service – 0.21,
promotion – 0.20, efficiency – 0.18, and participation
– 0.22, briefly summarized in Table 5.
Table 5. Weights of the synthetic indicator (D_GOV)
Intermediate
Origi
normalized
nal
weight (square D_GO
loadin factor loadings V
Variable
g
scaled to unit)
weight
1st composite (high loadings on factor 1) – 57% variance
D_VISION
0.95
0.34
0.20
D_PROMOTION
0.96
0.35
0.20
D_EFFICIENCY
0.90
0.31
0.18
2nd composite (high loadings on factor 2) – 43% variance
D_SERVICE
0.93
0.48
0.21
D_PARTICIPATION 0.96
0.52
0.22
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This way, we obtained statistics-proven weights
to aggregate the original variables into one synthetic
measure of digital government – D_GOV. The same
scale applies, from 1 (worst) to 7 (best).
Table 6 presents 20 (among 137) best performing
countries according to D_GOV. The list is topped by
Asian and particularly Middle Eastern countries.
Strong presence of well-developed Western countries
and one South American country – Uruguay – is also
noted. However, according to the 2016 Democracy
Index [65], less than half of the top digital performers
are “full democracies”, with the rest classified as
“flawed democracies” or “authoritarian regimes”.
To balance the digital and analog measures, we
applied the linear ordering Ideal Type algorithm to
the variable D_GOV and the attributes of analog
governance. To represent the latter, we applied six
dimensions of WGI. Given that one synthetic digital
indicator was put against six analog indicators, we
gave D_GOV six times bigger weight. All indicators
were standardized prior to analysis. The resulting
measure of balanced digital-analog performance is
called DA_GOV. For comparability with D_GOV,
the value of DA_GOV was rescaled from 0-1 to 1-7.
Table 6 presents 20 (among 137) best performing
countries according to DA_GOV. The DA_GOV
ranking is more nuanced that D_GOV. While
Singapore stays on top, Western democracies such as
the United Kingdom, United States, Sweden,
Switzerland, etc. achieved very high positions thanks

to the solid digital and traditional governance
performance. Notably, Uruguay is also at the top.
In two rightmost columns, Table 6 also presents
the countries with the largest gains and the largest
losses from considering their analog performance in
addition to digital performance. Notably, African and
generally poorer countries experienced the largest
gains, e.g. Zambia’s advanced by 72 positions.
Another remarkable change are large gains for former
socialist countries – Slovenia, Slovakia, Vietnam,
Serbia, Ukraine, Poland, Romania and Tajikistan –
suggesting that improvements in governance may
overpass digital progress. On the other hand, Asian
countries experienced the largest losses, e.g.
Azerbaijan retracted by 59 positions.
In general, D_GOV and DA_GOV are strongly
correlated – both Pearson and Spearman coefficients
equal 0.80. This hints that while individual changes
are noticeable, the range of analog corrections is not
dramatic. However, it should be also noticed that
D_GOV supplies half of the DA_GOV data content,
thus such accordance is expected.
To make comparisons more systematic, we
calculated the averages of D_GOV and DA_GOV
regarding three country profiles: geographic – based
on the UN’ classification [66], political – based on
the Freedom House’s assessment of political rights
and civil liberties [67], and economic – based on the
World Bank’s assignments to income groups [68].
The outcome is depicted in Table 7.

Table 6. D_GOV and DA_GOV - 20 best performances, 2016
No
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Digital ranking
Country
Singapore
United Arab Emirates
Republic of Korea
Bahrain
United Kingdom
Netherlands
Japan
France
Estonia
United States
Qatar
Israel
New Zealand
Australia
Canada
Norway
Malaysia
Saudi Arabia
Luxembourg
Uruguay

D_GOV
6.26
6.15
5.89
5.68
5.65
5.65
5.60
5.54
5.54
5.52
5.42
5.38
5.34
5.30
5.22
5.21
5.21
5.20
5.18
5.16

Balanced ranking
Country
United Kingdom
United States
Singapore
Uruguay
Sweden
United Arab Emirates
Switzerland
Spain
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Portugal
Qatar
Sri Lanka
Luxembourg
Japan
Republic of Korea
Slovakia
Vietnam
Slovenia

DA_GOV
6.39
6.28
5.91
5.86
5.69
5.68
5.32
5.19
5.15
5.07
5.04
4.90
4.82
4.71
4.70
4.67
4.65
4.61
4.60
4.54

Analog advantage
Country
Zambia
Trinidad and Tobago
South Africa
Slovenia
Slovakia
Uganda
Swaziland
Vietnam
Switzerland
Seychelles
Tanzania
Zimbabwe
Serbia
Ukraine
Poland
Paraguay
Tunisia
Romania
Thailand
Tajikistan

Change
+72
+60
+59
+57
+47
+46
+45
+44
+43
+38
+38
+38
+37
+37
+36
+36
+33
+33
+30
+29

Analog disadvantage
Country
Change
Azerbaijan
-59
Bahrain
-50
Bangladesh
-49
China
-48
Egypt
-48
Colombia
-47
Albania
-47
Armenia
-46
Kazakhstan
-44
Ethiopia
-40
Argentina
-40
Ecuador
-38
Kenya
-36
Brazil
-30
Gambia
-30
Côte d'Ivoire
-29
Bolivia
-29
Iran
-27
Honduras
-26
Costa Rica
-24
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Table 7. D_GOV and DA_GOV – average scores for
geographical, political and economic groupings
Subset
Geographic
Africa
Americas
Asia
Europe
Oceania
Political
Free
Partly free
Not free
Economic
High income
Upper-middle income
Lower-middle income
Low income

D_GOV

DA_GOV

3.25
3.81
4.25
4.35
5.32

3.16
3.54
3.73
4.17
4.73

4.35
3.55
3.78

4.13
3.32
3.32

4.79
3.79
3.49
3.01

4.51
3.41
3.24
2.96

On average, the best performing group, both in terms
of D_GOV and DA_GOV, is Oceania, and the least
performing group is Low Income countries. While
the values of DA_GOV are lower than D_GOV in
each category, the scales differs. Large declines can
be observed for Asia, Oceania and the countries that
are “not free”, and small for Africa and Low Income
countries, coinciding with their low D_GOV scores.

5. Discussion
This study contributes to theoretical and practical
aspects of digital government benchmarking.
Theoretical considerations lead us to formulate
three messages. First, the informal consensus that
existing digital benchmarking can contribute to the
digital state “metaphor” needs revision. As shown
here, this contribution is not obvious. Second, a
practice-oriented domain like digital government
must rely on contributions from different disciplines.
In particular, purely digital conceptualizations are
insufficient to capture the impact of digital
transformation on the “real” world. Thus digital
benchmarking should be applied through an external
lens, particularly political one. Third, digital
performance is just part of the picture, to be
“sustainable”, digital benchmarking needs to capture
the impact of digital transformation, among other
drivers of change, on the “analog” governance [69].
Practical considerations confirm the value of
statistical methods for new modes of benchmarking.
Problems highlighted in the digital government
literature can be quantified and suitable statistical
procedures can be applied to address them. It is not
necessarily about creating new instruments, even
fragmented data coming from existing instruments

can be processed to uncover new insights into the
outcomes of digitalization. For example, that official
propaganda placing strong emphasis on digital
advancement can hide serious deficits in analog
performance, that digital-analog imbalance shows
significant variations between groups of countries, or
that impressive results of the national digitalization
efforts should be met with some skepticism.
While we expect that this work will benefit
theorists and practitioners, the benefits extend to
policy-makers and -analysts. This study may help
them discover a path to a clear method of evaluating
digital strategy performance in relation to intended
governance outcomes, and make them aware that
relying on assortments of mutually inconsistent
instruments may lead to entirely wrong conclusions.

6. Conclusions
This paper demonstrates that existing approaches
to digital government benchmarking are not optimal
and need a solid revision in regard to their theoretical
foundations and practical usage. We have shown that
the problems signaled in theoretical studies, such as
the diversity and digital-analog disconnect of existing
benchmarks, may be expressed in statistical terms,
and that established statistical methods exist to help
build solutions to them. In particular: 1) specialized
methods help reformulate original benchmark
information in terms of fewer variables, and 2) it is
possible to augment digital measures with additional
analog measures for balancing and verification.
This research has some limitations. First, a
limited set of indicators was used from two
established instruments, spanning one year. A wider
selection of instruments and time periods could bring
more insights, e.g. uncover evolutionary trends.
Second, the statistical methods used come with some
limitations that were introduced earlier. Third, a clear
interpretation of the constructed synthetic measures
may appear challenging. Thus, we treat the results in
this paper not as a final product for assessing digital
and analog governance, but: 1) as a proof of concept
of a method of constructing synthetic and balanced
benchmarking instruments, and 2) as elaboration and
testing of a logic approach that could drive further
efforts towards constructing such instruments.
Fully applicable synthetic and balanced
benchmark construction is expected to involve a
comprehensive approach including thematic analysis,
wide selection of methods, availability of expert
opinions, etc. Testing such a construction over time is
also necessary. We plan to continue this research to
make synthetic and balanced benchmarking directly
applicable to digital government theory and practice.
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